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Introduction
Suggestions that we need to be more vigilant in the way that service quality is handled in
competitive tenders has often led to concerns about adding complexity to contract design
that would both discourage bidders and add unacceptable administrative costs to the
evaluation and monitoring process. The extent to which required service quality targets
would discourage bidders and/or add administrative costs will be dependent on how
complex the service quality formula becomes and the extent to which it adds to the
incentive (in)compatibility of the tendering process.
While cost efficiency gains are important in the establishment of a successful competitive
bid, the definition preconditions the outcome on a given level of service. Such a
(minimum) service level is typically defined by the amount of service kilometres and hours
delivered over a network subject to a conditions on access distance to the network. This
definition of service levels does not take into account what really influences a users
perception of the effectiveness of a service.
This paper proposes a way of measuring service quality that results in a very simple and
intuitively appealing formula that is transparent, is incentive compatible, easy to administer
and monitor and which can be integrated into the specification of a competitive tender. In
developing such a service quality index (SQI) we integrate the rich literatures on stated
choice methods and performance measurement, redefining service effectiveness as a two-
dimensional construct in which perceived service quality is a major component. The
empirical study illustrates how a discrete choice model framework in which alternative bus
service packages are evaluated provides an appropriate way of identifying the underlying
service attributes that represent service quality and their relative importance from the
passengers' perspective.
The inclusion of service quality opens up an opportunity to review the way that
competitive tenders are structured to take into account improved service quality in line
with benchmarked best practice.  In addition to requiring the delivery of a specific level of
service, we might include a requirement to provide this level of service to comply with a
target service quality as specified by SQI. One possible strategy is to inform bidders of the
current level of service quality on each of the dimensions of the SQI (together with the
weights for each attribute) and to require that the successful bidder move the index up to a
new level by adjusting the levels of one or more of the attributes in the index. For example
moving the SQI from 1.3 to 1.6. The operator can determine how to achieve the target
level and what it might cost and build this cost into the price of the bid. In this way we are
encouraging improvements in service quality under incentive compatible tenders that are
an improvement over the traditional cost only contracts. This SQI is the preferred
indicator of passenger service quality in a competitive tendering and/or performance
assessment regime.
This paper is organised as follows. We begin with a review of approaches to specify an
indicator of service quality. This is followed by the justification for the stated preference
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paradigm with a focus on evaluating packages of service attributes. The empirical context
and survey instrument are presented followed by the analysis results from a multinomial
logit model and the construction of the service quality index. The final section preceding
the conclusion suggest a schema for integrating SQI into the specification of a competitive
tender, including the determination of targets and conditions of review and renewal.
The Search for an Operational Indicator of Service
Quality
The literature on measuring the cost efficiency and cost effectiveness of bus services and
operations is extensive (eg Hensher and Daniels 1995, Fielding et al 1985). A major data
input is the level of service output, typically measured on the demand side by annual
passenger trips or passenger kilometres and on the supply side by vehicle kilometres. As
aggregate indicators of total output, these measures implicitly assume homogeneity in
respect of service quality. Passengers however evaluate services in many ways, which may
not be systematically associated with the amount of use of the service; indeed it is unclear
whether differences in passenger satisfaction across the segments served by buses can be
proxied by the preferred demand side indicator, aggregate passenger kilometres.
In the 1970's British rail argued that maximisation of passenger kilometres was a good
proxy indicator of social welfare maximisation and accessibility offered to passengers. At
the time, however, there had not been any substantive investigation of how passengers
perceive the level and quality of services in their determination of passenger satisfaction. A
number of studies have since refocused on the measurement of service quality,
investigating the role of trade-off methods such as stated preference (eg Hensher 1991,
Swanson et al 1997) and univariate procedures that rate individual service items on a
satisfaction scale (eg Cunningham et al 1997).
Although specific aspects of service quality may be particularly positive or negative in a
passenger's perception of (and satisfaction with) a service, we make the assumption that
the overall level of passenger satisfaction is best measured by how an individual evaluates
the total package of services on offer. Appropriate weights attached to each service
dimension will reveal the strength of positive and negative sources of overall satisfaction.
The stated preference (SP) paradigm enables us to develop preference formulae for a large
number of service level scenarios, which can be implemented at the bus business level to
establish operator-specific indicators of service delivery quality and effectiveness. The
resulting satisfaction (or utility) indicators emanating from the estimation of the stated
preference experiments measure the expected utility that a passenger obtains from the
current levels of service and how this might change under alternative service level
regimes1.
                                         
1 Given the heterogeneity of the population of bus passengers, segment-specific service quality indicators
can be identified.
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The Stated Preference Paradigm
The task is to develop an approach to incorporating a service quality indicator into a
performance assessment regime that is a meaningful measure of service effectiveness from
a passenger perspective. In addition, such an index should have the ability to be
decomposed into its constituent sources of passenger satisfaction, as well as mapping into
an aggregate demand-side indicator of passenger output to establish the role of the latter
as a practical approximation of the social welfare significance of the bus service levels.
The starting position is a recognition that passengers purchase a package of service
attributes when travelling on a bus and thus the contribution of each underlying elemental
attribute must be assessed in the context of the overall quality of service on offer. The
attributes are not necessarily independent of each other and hence the use of univariate
methods such as satisfaction scales associated with each attribute are quite misleading as a
basis if inferring the role of each attribute in the measurement of overall consumer
satisfaction.
With a complex disaggregation of service quality, revealed preference data (RP) is
inappropriate. There is too much confoundment in RP data, best described as ‘dirty’ from
the point of view of statistical estimation of the individual influences on choice.
Furthermore some attributes such as air conditioning do not exist today on many urban
buses so we are unable to establish their influence.
An alternative data paradigm emerged in the late 1970s (Louviere and Hensher 1982,
1983, Wordworth and Louviere 1983). As a redefinition of the SC approach of earlier
years, the focus was not on a different set of measures of trading between service
attributes but a re-specification of the way in which the choice outcome and the attribute
levels were defined. In contrast to RP data in which the choice outcome was exactly
known (by observation) and the attributes of each alternative were measured with error
(due the reporting process), SC data were defined by a set of attributes with precise levels
and a choice outcome that was reported with error.  Although the initial SC models were
based on a rating or ranking exercise, which gave them limited credibility within the
economic paradigm the turning point of acceptance came when it was shown that SC data
with a choice response is identical to RP data except for its measurement and specification
properties (Louviere and Hensher 1983, Woodworth and Louviere 1983, Hensher 1994,
Hensher Louviere and Swait 1999).
Stated preference (SP) methods provided the richness required for the service quality
index (SQI). It involves a stated choice experiment in which we systematically vary
combinations of levels of each attribute to reveal new opportunities relative to the existing
service levels on offer. Through the experimental design paradigm we observe a sample of
travelers making choices between the current trip attribute level bundle and other attribute
level bundles. This approach is capable of separating out the independent contributions of
each service component and hence is capable of providing an SQI that is a rich
representation of the sources of service (dis)utility.
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Defining the Empirical Setting and the SP Experiment
To assist in the selection of attributes for the SQI, we undertook an extensive review of
the literature as well as a survey of bus operators who have a wealth of experience on
what customers look for in a good service (see Prioni and Hensher 1999). We found that
thirteen attributes describe the major dimensions of service quality from a user’s
perspective. The range of levels of each attribute in Table 1 provided us with a mechanism
for establishing the weights that signal the contribution of each attribute to the overall
SQI.
Table 1. The Set of Attributes and Attributes Levels in the SP Experiment
Attribute Interpretation of levels Attribute Interpretation of levels
Reliability -on time
-5 minutes late
-10 minutes late
Info at the bus
stop
-on time
-5 minutes late
-10 minutes late
Frequency -every 15 minutes
-every 30 minutes
-every 60 minutes
Travel Time -25% quicker than the current travel
time
-same as now
-25% longer than the current travel time
Walking
distance to the
bus stop
 -now
-5 minutes more
-10 minutes more
Bus stop
facilities
-Bus shelter with seats
-Seats only
-No shelter or seats at all
Waiting safety -very safe
-reasonably safe
-reasonably unsafe
Fare -25% more than the current one-way
fare
-same as now
-25% less than the current one-way fare
Access to the
bus
-Wide entry with no steps
-Wide entry with 2 steps
-Narrow entry with 4 steps
Driver attitude -Very friendly
-friendly enough
-Very unfriendly
Air
conditioning
Cleanliness of
seats
-Available with no surcharge
-Available with a surcharge of
 20% on existing one-way fare
-Not available
-Very clean
-Clean enough
-Not clean enough
Safety on board -The ride is very smooth with no
  sudden braking
-The ride is generally smooth with rare
  sudden braking
-The ride is jerky; sudden braking
  occurs often
Through a formal statistical design the attribute levels are combined into bus packages
before being translated into a survey form. The full factorial design (ie all possible bus
packages) consists of 313 combinations of the 13 attributes each of three levels. To
produce a practicable and understandable design for the respondents, we restricted the
number of combinations to 81 (ie 81 choice sets) using a fractional design. Fractional
designs permit the reduction in the number of combinations (ie the number of bus
packages) without losing important statistical information (see Louviere, Hensher and
Swait in press).
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A pre-test of the survey showed that respondents were able to evaluate consistently three
choice sets (ie different scenarios of bus packages), resulting in 27 different survey forms.
To allow for a rich variation in the combinations of attribute levels to be evaluated as
service packages in the SP experiment, each bus operator received 8 sets of 27 different
survey forms (ie 216 forms) and instructions on how to organise the survey. An example
of an SP question is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. A Typical Stated Preference Exercise
SERVICE FEATURE BUS PACKAGE OF THE BUS
 COMPANY A
BUS PACKAGE OF THE BUS
COMPANY B
BUS PACKAGE OF THE
CURRENT BUS
Reliability 10 minutes late on time 7 minutes late
One-way fare same as now same as now 2 dollars
Walking distance to the bus
stop
5 minutes more than now 5 minutes more than now 5 minutes
Personal Safety at the bus
stop
reasonably unsafe reasonably safe very safe
Travel Time 25% longer than the current travel time 25% quicker than the current
travel time
30 minutes
Bus stop facilities No shelter or seats at all Seats only Seats only
Air conditioning Not available Available with no surcharge Not available
Information at the bus stop Timetable but no map Timetable but no map Timetable and a map
Frequency Every 15 minutes Every 30 minutes Every 60  minutes
Safety on board The ride is jerky; sudden braking
occurs often
The ride is jerky; sudden
braking
occurs often
The ride is jerky; sudden
braking occurs often
Cleanliness of seats Clean enough Clean enough Very clean
Ease of access to the bus Wide entry with no steps inside the bus Wide entry with 2 steps inside
the bus
Wide entry with 2 steps 
inside the bus
Driver behaviour Friendly enough Very friendly Very friendly
If BUS A and BUS B were available today, which bus service would you choose?
¨ BUS A ¨ BUS B ¨ The bus you are travelling on.
Results of the User Preference Model
Scheduled2 bus users of 25 private bus operators in NSW participated. Survey forms were
distributed and collected during April and May 1999.  A total of 3,849 useable
observations (out of 4,334 returns) were incorporated in the estimation of the discrete
choice model. A multinomial logit (MNL) specification was selected. This is appropriate
for a model form in which the utility expressions associated with the current trip and two
attribute packages are unlabelled (or unranked) alternatives. Consequently all design
attributes were generic across the three alternatives. In addition in the current trip
alternative we considered alternative-specific characteristics of the passenger (income,
gender, age and car availability) and of the operator together with a number of other
                                         
2School children were excluded from the sample, as they are captive users and might have a biased perception
towards the attributes.
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potential influences on relative utility such a treatment effect, trip purpose and access
mode.
The user attribute choice model is summarised in Table 3. The model includes the
attributes of the SP experiment, operator-specific dummy variables and three user
characteristics. The overall goodness of fit (adjusted pseudo-R2) of the model is 0.324.
The great majority of the design attributes are statistically significant. Service reliability (ie
the extent to which buses arrive on time), fares, access time and travel time are all highly
significant with the expected negative sign. Relative to ‘reasonably unsafe’, we find a
positive (almost) significant parameter estimate for ‘reasonably safe’ (0.1510) and for
‘very safe’ (0.1889). The higher estimate for ‘very safe’ in contrast to ‘reasonably safe’ is
plausible. The infrastructure at the bus stop appears not to be a major influence on service
quality with both ‘seats only’ and ‘bus shelter with seats’ not being statistically significant
relative to ‘no shelter or seats’. If reproducible in further studies this has important policy
implications as to priorities in service improvement. The availability of air conditioning is
another interesting result. We find that ‘air conditioning without a fare surcharge’ is not
statistically significant relative to no air conditioning. In contrast the provision of air
conditioning with a 20% surcharge on existing fares is statistically significant with a
negative sign suggesting that users would sooner not have air conditioning if it means
paying higher fares.
On-board safety defined by the smoothness of the ride is a statistically strong attribute.
Relative to ‘the ride is jerky with sudden braking occurring often’, we find that ‘the ride is
generally smooth with rare sudden braking’ and ‘the ride is smooth with no sudden
braking’ are both very important positive attributes of service quality. This suggests both
policy initiatives in driver skill as well as vehicle quality. Cleanliness of the bus is
statistically significant when ‘very clean’ relative to ‘not clean enough’. The non-statistical
(1.830) significance of ‘clean enough’ suggests that we really have a dichotomy between
very clean and not very clean. Ease of access to a bus, closely linked to the issue of
accessible transport turns out to be not so important overall, presumably because the
majority of users (including many aging users) are sufficiently healthy to not be concerned
with the configuration of steps and entry widths. The attitude of the driver is a statistically
strong influence on a user’s perception of service quality. Indeed, relative to ‘very
unfriendly’ we might expect a significant increase in the mean parameter estimate when we
go from ‘friendly enough’ to ‘very friendly’. This is the most non-linear effect on utility of
all the attributes of service quality. Finally, the availability of information at the bus stop
(timetable and map) is statistically important compared to ‘no information’, although
surprisingly the key information item is a timetable, with a map being a liability (possibly
because of experience with vandalism?).
Finally, bus frequency defined as 15, 30 and 60 minutes was found to be significant when
treated as a dummy variable distinguishing 60 minutes from 15 and 30 minutes. There is a
strong negative sign for the 60 minute dummy variable suggesting that a 60 minute service
reduces relative utility significantly compared with a service frequency of every 15 or 30
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minutes. Not statistically significant is the 30 minutes dummy variable, defined equal to
one for frequencies equal to 30 minutes.
The socioeconomic characteristics sought from bus users were limited to personal income,
age, gender and car availability. We found that individuals on higher incomes and of more
years were more likely to prefer the levels of service offered by the existing trip than by
the alternative packages. What this suggests is that as individuals age and increase their
income, they see existing service quality as increasingly satisfying their requirements for
service quality. Alternatively it is the younger and those on lower incomes that see a
greater need for improved service quality. Car availability was not statistically significant.
Further details are given in Prioni and Hensher (1999).
Table 3. Final User Preference Model
Variable                                 Units             Acronym        Parameter          t-value
Reliability mins RELI     -.05821    -8.411
Bus fare  $ TARIF     -.4780     -6.406
Access time mins ACCESST   -.04317    -5.311
Bus time  mins TRATIM    -.03200    -5.435
Very safe  1,0 VSAFE       .18895   2.255
Reasonably safe 1,0 RSAFE       .15108   1.820
Seats only at bus stop 1,0 SEATS    -.03411  -.510
Seat plus shelter 1,0 SEATSHEL    .09040   1.503
Air conditioning free 1,0 AVALFREE    .07131     1.112
AC at 20% extra fare 1,0 AVALPAY   -.17432    -2.207
Ride-generally smooth 1,0 GSBRAKE     .20788     2.963
Ride-very smooth 1,0 VSNBRAKE    .35232     4.904
Clean enough 1,0 CENOUGH     .13867     1.830
Very clean 1,0 VCLEAN      .20446     2.713
Wide entry/2 steps 1,0 WIDE2STP   .09589     1.499
Wide entry/no steps 1,0 WIDENSTP  -.10319    -1.372
Driver friendly enough 1,0 FRIENDEN   .19798     2.572
Driver very friendly 1,0 VFRIEND    .42287     5.564
Timetable only 1,0 TIMNOMAP    .29609     4.745
Timetable and map 1,0 TIMWMAP     .19720     3.021
Frequency/every 60 mins 1,0 FREQ60   -.58595    -6.902
Frequency/every 30 mins  1,0 FREQ30   -.12221    -1.640
Female 1,0 FEMALE     .09986     1.198
Personal income $’000s PINCO       .00905     3.817
Age of passenger years AGES        .01379     5.787
Operator 1 1,0 Op1     .37358     1.671
Operator 2 1,0 Op2   .19642      .654
Operator 3 1,0 Op3   -.94098    -5.49 7
Operator 4 1,0 Op4  - .17726    -1.080
Operator 5 1,0 Op5  - .12964     -.653
Operator 6 1,0 Op6     .97267     1.937
Operator 7 1,0 Op7   -.18127    -0.982
Operator 8 1,0 Op8      .35723     1.294
Operator 9 1,0 Op9    -.26210    -1.215
Operator 10 1,0 Op10   -.56626    -1.845
Operator 11 1,0 Op11    -1.2555    -4.850
Operator 12 1,0 Op12   -.22189    -0.842
Operator 13 1,0 Op13   -.47366    -1.210
Operator 14 1,0 Op14     .01784      .072
Operator 15 1,0 Op15      .06911      .084
Operator 16 1,0 Op16   -.37973    -1.685
Operator 17 1,0 Op17   .06878      .292
Operator 18 1,0 Op18   -.36574    -0.825
Operator 19 1,0 Op19    1.1207     4.218
Operator 20 1,0 Op20       .10014      .488
Operator 21 1,0 Op21       .11275      .546
Operator 22 1,0 Op22       .32239      .781
Operator 23 1,0 Op23      -.53292    -1.845
Operator 24 1,0 Op24       .08878      .161
Log-likelihood                      -2839.25
Pseudo R 2 (adjusted)                  0.324
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The Service Quality Indicator (SQI)
The Service Quality Index (SQI) for each operator is calculated by the application of the
utility expression in Table 3 and the levels of each of the attributes associated with the
current trip experience of each sampled passenger. In this study we have estimated a single
set of utility weights across the sample of 3,849 passengers using the services of 25
operators. We investigated possibilities of differences in weights between segments of
operators (eg Sydney metropolitan vs regional vs country towns) and found no statistically
significant differences. This is most encouraging, suggesting a similar pattern of
preferences of passengers across all operating environments. This does not mean however
that the levels of service offered on each service attribute are the same (indeed there is
substantial variation as shown in Figure 1 of the mean and standard deviation of each
attribute for each operator). Rather what we are noting is that the marginal utilities of each
attribute (ie the mean parameter estimate of part-worth weight) is well represented by a
single mean estimate across all operators.
The SQI developed for each operator is summarised in Table 4 and graphed in Figure 1 at
its mean for each operator. We have normalised SQI in Figure 1 to a base of zero for the
operator with the lowest relative SQI. The range is from 0 to 2.70.
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Service Quality Index
Operator Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum Sample Size
1 0.5311 0.788 -2.39 2.28 249
2 0.3900 0.894 -1.87 2.00 96
3 -.8178 1.248 -4.88 1.92 508
4 -1.098 0.927 -5.58 0.58 374
5 -1.2840 1.406 -5.46 0.84 196
6 -.8377 0.383 -.525 0.80 24 *
7 -.9263 1.297 -6.74 1.82 412
8 -.7113 0.566 -2.12 0.44 150
9 -.4597 0.685 -2.55 1.06 173
10 -.5805 0.904 -3.06 0.67 64 *
11 -1.628 0.979 -4.55 0.55 90
12 -.3923 1.000 -3.80 1.40 100
13 0.5435 0.483 -.434 1.28 41 *
14 0.7636 0.940 -2.28 2.61 180
15 0.2079 0.637 -.638 0.692 9 *
16 -.6345 0.958 -4.00 1.03 159
17 -.0649 1.089 -2.86 2.09 190
18 -.5687 1.206 -3.24 1.04 27 *
19 1.0174 0.947 -.990 2.70 203
20 -.0444 0.639 -1.43 1.55 224
21 -.4212 0.852 -3.45 1.17 227
22 0.6466 0.643 -.600 2.01 46 *
23 -.3076 1.034 -4.28 .808 65*
24 .1051 1.156 -2.17 1.42 22*
25 -1.7579 .875 -3.01 -.096 20*
All -.4067 1.224 -6.74 2.70 3849
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In developing the SQI indicator we have taken into account the differences in the socio-
economic composition of the travelling public (eg age, income, car availability), the
method of data collection (eg on board vs hand out and mail back) and location of
operator. The contribution of each service quality attribute across all 25 operators in
summarised in Figure 2 (and defined in Table 5).
The challenge for an operator is to compare themselves against best practice and to
establish how best to improve overall service quality through implementing changes that
reduce the magnitude of the attributes below the zero axis in Figure 2 and increase the
magnitude of attributes above the zero axis.
Figure 1. The Service Quality Index
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
25 11 5 4 7 3 8 16 10 18 9 21 12 23 6 20 17 24 15 2 1 13 22 14 19
Figure 2. The composition of the service quality index (all operators in the sample)
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Table 5. Notation for Figure 2
URELI Late minutes
UTARIF Bus fare
UACCESST Access time
UTRATIM Travel time
UVSAFE Very safe
URSAFE Reasonably safe
USEATS Seats only at bus stop
USEATSHEL Seats plus shelter at stop
UAVALFREE Free Air conditioning
UAVALPAY Air conditioning at 20%
extra fare
UGSBRAKE Smooth ride
UVSNBRAKE Ride very smooth
UCENOUGH Clean enough
UVCLEAN Very clean
UWIDE2STP Wide entry and 2 steps
UWIDENSTP Wide entry no steps
UFRIENDN Friendly drivers
UVFRIEND Drivers very friendly
UTIMWMAP Timetable and map
UTIMNOMAP Timetable, no map
UFREQ60 Frequency 60 minutes
UFREQ30 Frequency 30 minutes
Operationalising SQI as a Regulatory Tool
Integrating SQI targets in the specification of tenders
A growing criticism of competitive tendering is that economic regulators have failed to
build into the specification of tender documents information on the quality of incumbent
services from the users’ perspective. This gap in the tendering process denies potential
bidders the opportunity to prepare their bid offers with full knowledge of the effectiveness
of existing service levels (Domberger et al 1995, Van de Velde and Sleuwaegen 1997).
SQI provides an appealing index to compute and operationalise service quality from an
user perspective in an easy and scientific way. Because of its simplicity and its ability in
capturing every important user-defined service quality component in a single index, SQI is
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a preferred operational tool in the specification of tendering contracts. SQI makes explicit
through the revelation of information on current service quality the requirement to take
into account the cost of maintaining and even enhancing service quality in bid offers,
minimising the selection of low bids accompanied by low service quality delivery.
Traditional contracting makes no allowance for loss or gain of passengers. All that it
requires is that the provider of the service satisfies conditions on delivery of minimum
service levels specified by for example the total number of vehicle-kilometres, the network
configuration, or the frequency of the service; but if a successful tender has for example a
bad driver it might loose passengers and that feature of service is not accommodated in the
specification of the contract. Our method takes this into account. An identification of SQI
prior to tendering would allow the responsible authority to gain information on customers’
satisfaction with the current levels of service quality and to include this information in the
form of service quality targets in the contract specification.
Table 6 gives an example on how one might integrate SQI targets into the tender process.
Let us assume that from a survey of a sample of existing users, we have identified the
user-defined quality of current service of three operators. Operator 1 achieved an SQI of
1.4 by providing a service that is on average two minutes late, clean enough for 60% of
the sampled users, costs on average $2.1, etc. Operators 2 and 3 have SQI’s respectively
of 1.3 and 2.0. Assuming that these operators are comparable, Operator 3 is best practice.
Regulators can use the SQI in the contract design to specify how much service
improvement they require relative to the current levels as illustrated in the last two
columns of Table 6. Although one might impose the requirement that each and every bus
operator must be at best practice, this may discourage bidders and so we prefer to set a
target level that is recognised as achievable by potential bidders. The level should be
incentive compatible.
Table 6. Including SQI targets in the contact design
                Current Service description SQI
Attributes Target after
Operator Reliability Bus fare Clean enoughTravel timeetc… realised 2.5 yrs 5 yrs.
1 2 minutes late 2.1 60% 25 minutes … 1.4 1.6 1.8
2 1 minutes late 2.4 78% 26 minutes … 1.3
3 1 minutes late 2.0 80% 21 minutes … 2.0
Given the gap between an operator’s SQI and that of best practice (e.g. 0.6 for operator
3), we suggest a formulation SQI+zwhere z is the predesignated improvement over a
period of time (e.g. 0.2 in both sub periods). This is analogous to the CPI-x productivity
formula used to regulate public utilities where the franchised operator raises its fare level
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every year in line with the general level of inflation (CPI) less a fixed amount (x) that
reflects productivity improvement. The SQI+z formula provides a target in line with a pre-
designated increase in the service quality level. In the case of the service previously
provided by incumbent operator 1, authorities impose an SQI target of 1.6 after 2.5 years
and a final SQI target of 1.8 at the end of the contract (5 years).
We must recognise that best practice will change over time and hence the target will be
revised. Such a revision should be used to reset the value of z for the next 2.5 years and
not backdated. In practice all potential entrants must be provided with the computational
formula for SQI. According to their managerial and operational capability they will decide
on how to decompose the index into the individual attribute components to achieve the
targeted SQI. For example an operator might prefer to put more effort into the cleanliness
of the vehicles and less into the reliability attribute (due to the difficult traffic conditions)
but still comply with the targeted SQI.
The required service quality level will then be evaluated by bidders and added into the cost
of providing the higher level of service to determine the bid price. The contract will be
awarded to the lowest price offer (with the cost of service quality internalised). Once
successful in winning the contract the operator has a strong incentive to meeting the new
levels of service. Compared to the traditional tender contract specification, the inclusion of
SQI in the contract secures improvements in cost efficiency while meeting the new levels
of service effectiveness as prescribed by a user-defined service index.
Establishing the actual target
There are no specific arguments for establishing a particular SQI target other than to
ensure an incentive compliant tendering process. The success of competitive tendering is
determined among other things by the number of bidders: the greater the number of
bidders the lower the bid price (see Glaister and Cox 1991, White and Tough 1995). For
this reason the target SQI needs to be achievable and not necessarily set equal to best
practice. In the incremental approach proposed, the value of z can b predetermined
through negotiation between the regulator and industry although the size of z should not
violate the conditions for an incentive compliant tendering process. As part of the process
of establishing the value of z, ne might look to existing evidence on the differences
between best practice SQI and a specific operator’s SQI. That is, best practice might be
used as a mechanism for partitioning the targets over the life of the contract. Figure 3
illustrates such a difference.
Figure 3. A comparison of an operator against best practice
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Authorities can define the targeted service quality to be based on all or a subset of the
attributes reported herein. One can remove attributes that the regulator and/or the bus and
coach industry might argue are not inclusions in an operational service quality indicator.
For example, if it was argued that travel time and fares should be excluded this can easily
be achieved with a new ordering of operators. SQI is therefore not only appealing for its
simplicity (only one number) but also for its flexibility in accommodating changes in
external factors (like changes in government policy or in the socioeconomic structure of
the service area).
Moreover bus operators can be classified on a number of criteria agreed on between
government and industry to arrive at operator membership of a segment. Benchmarking
can then be undertaken within each segment (e.g. metropolitan/non metrpolitan area).
Monitoring and responses
To ensure contract compliance the supplier must be monitored during the contract period.
This involves collecting and interpreting information that can be used to determine
whether the specified bus services are achieving the new targeted SQI. Assuming a
contract length of five years we propose a performance assessment at the midpoint. An
operator would have to conduct a user survey after 2.5 years to establish compliance. To
avoid any disputes on who should pay for the survey, it makes good sense to include the
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monitoring cost as part of transactions costs of the bid and included in the bid price. Table
7 summarises the four possible outcomes of a contractual process.
Table 7. Possible outcomes of a tender
Renewal Retender
Compliant End of the 5 years End of the 5 years
Non compliant Re tendered Retender:
- (Warning after 2.5 years)
If the operator is compliant it becomes a political decision whether the contract will be
renewed or retendered at the end of the contract period. In case of non-compliance after
the first half of the contract period, the non-compliant operator should be warned about
under performance without loosing a contract. If the operator is unable to achieve the
target performance by the end of the contract period the contract should be retendered. In
the case of a non-compliant operator, the tendering authority must determine if the
reasons for non-compliance are internal to the contractor (ie under his control) or external
(ie not under control of the operator). Only internal failure needs to be corrected through
sanctions. In case of external factors influencing the operator’s service quality the
tendering authority should review the pre-agreed targets.
The extent of benefits from competitive tendering depend not only on the size of the
targeted SQI (see previous section) but also on other factors influencing the amount of
competition. The size of irrecoverable costs, the length of the contract and the perceived
probability of success will be critical factors in determining how many bidders come
forward. The provision of information on existing service quality levels of the incumbent is
essential to the success of the broadened specifications of competitive tenders if potential
bidders are to be forthcoming.
Conclusions
We have developed a new approach to quantifying a service quality index (SQI) to enable
the economic regulator and bus operators to benchmark service effectiveness, adding this
much neglected dimension of performance assessment. The inclusion of service quality
standards (ie SQI) in contract design avoids evaluation criteria exclusively based on a
supply principle (cost efficiency). Competing offers can be judged according to their cost
efficiency and service effectiveness. Indeed we have convincing evidence from ITS's
international benchmarking program for the bus and coach industry that best practice
operators on overall cost efficiency are seldom close to best practice on service quality.
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We can now claim to have established a global measure of service effectiveness to parallel
the global indicators used to measure cost efficiency and cost effectiveness (ie total factor
productivity). Further details of the methods are presented in Prioni and Hensher (1999).
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